Vertical integration in production and services: development in transaction cost economics

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Uncovering the hidden costs of offshoring: The interplay of complexity, organizational design, and experience

This study investigates estimation errors due to hidden costs—the costs of implementation that are neglected in strategic decision-making processes—in the context of services offshoring. Based on data from the Offshoring Research Network, we find that decision makers are more likely to make cost-estimation errors given increasing configuration and task complexity in captive offshoring and offshore outsourcing, respectively. Moreover, we show that experience and a strong orientation toward organizational design in the offshoring strategy reduce the cost-estimation errors that follow from complexity. Our findings contribute to research on the effectiveness of sourcing and global strategies by stressing the importance of organizational design and experience in dealing with increasing complexity

Mind the Costs: Rescaling and Multi-Level Environmental Governance in Venice Lagoon

Competences over environmental matters are distributed across agencies at different scales on a national-to-local continuum. This article adopts a transaction costs economics perspective in order to explore the question whether, in the light of a particular problem, the scale at which a certain competence is attributed can be reconsidered. Specifically, it tests whether a presumption of least-cost operation concerning an agency at a given scale can hold. By doing so, it investigates whether the rescaling of certain tasks, aiming at solving a scale-related problem, is likely to produce an increase in costs for day-to-day agency operations as compared to the status quo. The article explores such a perspective for the case of Venice Lagoon. The negative aspects of the present arrangement concerning fishery management and morphological remediation are directly linked to the scale of the agencies involved. The analysis suggests that scales have been chosen correctly, at least from the point of view of the costs incurred to the agencies involved. Consequently, a rescaling of those agencies does not represent a viable option

The theory of international business: the role of economic models

This paper reviews the scope for economic modelling in international business studies. It argues for multi-level theory based on classic internalisation theory. It present a systems approach that encompasses both firm-level and industry-level analysis

Knowledge Sharing in Alliances and Alliance Portfolios

We develop a model of knowledge sharing in alliances and alliance portfolios. We show that, once the issue of encouraging effective collaboration is put center stage, many standard intuitions of the learning race view and alliance portfolio literature are overturned or qualified. Partners engage in learning races in some cases, but exhibit “altruistic” behaviors in other cases. They may reduce their own absorptive capacity or increase the transparency of their own operations to facilitate their partner’s learning. In alliance portfolios, we show that not all substitutability between alliance portfolio partners is bad. We distinguish between substitutability in implementation and substitutability in rival benefits and show that the latter is conducive to knowledge sharing. Our work contributes toward putting the literature on learning alliances on a more solid foundation by emphasizing the importance of commitments that leading firms can make to encourage collaboration

Mitigating agency risk between investors and ventures’ managers

The general management literature has long focused on the agency risks involved in the relationship between general managers and shareholders. Shareholders can deploy contractual and non-contractual mechanisms to reduce these inefficiencies. This study examines - based on a broad international sample of investment contracts - how the use of contractual and non-contractual mechanisms is related to the degree of risks associated with the venture’s development stage as well as how these practices differ across countries. Hypotheses are tested using a proprietary dataset of 265 hand-collected investment contracts associated with ventures in the U.S., Israel and nine European countries. Findings suggest that the use of mitigating contractual and non-contractual mechanisms is related to the degree of agency risks, and that these practices vary across countries. This study draws implications for how investors can best deploy their capital in different institutional settings whilst nurturing their relationships with managers and entrepreneurs

E-supply chain integration adoption: examination of buyer–supplier relationships

The purpose of this study is to empirically examine the adoption of e-supply chain integration by electrical and electronic industry suppliers. This study has integrated both the transaction cost and resource-dependence models in understanding the influence of buyer–seller relationships on e-supply chain integration. Hypotheses were developed based on the proposed model. Data were collected from 122 electrical and electronic suppliers located in Malaysia. The data was examined using multiple regression analysis. The results showed that Asset Specificity, Product Technological Uncertainty, Transaction frequency, Proportion of sales to e-supply chain integration promoter, and number of customers are able to explain suppliers’ decisions to adopt e-supply chain integrations with their buyers. Buyers that would like to improve the adoptions of e-supply chain integration will be able to formulate and plan strategies from the buyer–seller relationships perspectives